eigiity. A republican culture is one which recognises diese central tenets ol republican ism, and seeks to build upon diem. Official Australian republicanism, however, is characterised by a neglect of questions of institutional structure and constitutional bal ance, and by a positive aversion to involving die people in government to a greater extent than diey are now involved. It is in relation to die head of state issue diat these characteristics are most clearly exposed.
The absence from official republicanism of a republican culture is maintained by an avoidance of serious historical or dieoretical analysis. A little such analysis reveals the necessary elements of such a culture.
The idea diat die absence of monarchy may be a necessary, but is not a sufficient, condition to constitute a republic is far from new. "Hie reader has to get well into the ancient Roman Cicero's treatise D e Re Publica before finding die statement that the holding of an office of state for life is incompatible widi res publica, which by defini tion is a partnership belonging to die whole community. Hie essence of res publica lies not in the absence of a king, but in institutional arrangements diat maintain the partnership and avoid anybody using die state to dominate everybody else.
The founders of die first m odem republic, die United States of America, might be diought to have had a ready-made republican culture on which to build. Before diey broke from Britain, die colonies were de facto self-governing republics only nominally under die crown; effective power was held by assemblies elected on wide franchises, and two colonies even elected dieir own governors. The founders drew up dieir new constitution, however, against a background of demonstrated failures of die republican state governments. These failures, manifest in one case in armed rebellion and war, were attributed to die weaknesses identified by Cicero: domination of gov ernment by factions and absence of balanced institutional structures. Not just any union, but a well-constructed union, was required to provide republican remedies against die diseases common to republics (Madison et al., 1787 (Madison et al., :1970 51: 263-7) .
The Australian founders were more republican dian dieir current would-be suc cessors. Aldiough diey constructed dieir union under die British crown, diey em braced die salient features of republican government, even adopting die name 'Commonwealdi', die English equivalent of res publica and of die latinate 'republic'. They had a keen appreciation of die importance of well-designed institutions. Thus, diey readily accepted die foreign model of federalism as die institutional basis of die Australian union. Federalism for diem encompassed such institutional devices as specified central powers, equal representation of die States in die Senate and coordi nate powers in die two houses of parliament, all un-British innovations. voted much of their debates to the shape and relationships ol institutions. They were also good republicans in relying on the ultimate power of the people: both houses of the parliament were to be directly elected, and the new constitution would be ap proved by, and amendable only by, referendum. The only deficiency in Australia's republican culture may be seen not in accepting the British crown but, on one view, in having self-government handed down from above before federation instead of build ing it from below, as had largely occurred with die American colonies. Federation itself , however, was an indigenous growdi widi strong popular participation.
The head of state issue is gready illuminated by bringing to bear upon it die es sential republican principles of sound institutional design and ultimate popular con trol.
The Head of State and Institutional Design
Some have suggested diat we do not need a head of state (Republic Advisory Commit tee, 1993:47-51) . Parliament alter each election could elect die ministry, which would remain in office until the next parliament is elected, and if necessary could elect a new ministry in the course of a parliament But diis would mean diat die prime minister or premier would become die de facto head of state. There would also be die ques tion of whedier lower houses should be dissolvable within dieir term, and, if so, who is to exercise die dissolution power and how its misuse by a prime minister or premier is to be restrained. Most people would agree that, if we are to retain die responsible government, or cabinet system, whereby the executive government is carried on by a ministry having die support of die lower house, a constitutional umpire will be needed, holding die powers currendy held by die Governor-General or some modifi cation of diem, to act as a final arbiter in situations in which the lower house is not able to constitute or support a ministry or die ministry seeks to subvert or bypass die processes of responsible government.
The official republican movement, represented by the previous government's 'preferred option', embraces die 'minimalist' position of changing die head of state widi die aim of little or no change to the system of government. This is diought to rule out an elected president. The contradiction in calling diis position 'republican' has already been noted: it is intended to provide a sort of indigenous, noil-hereditary constitutional monarch. It is thought diat the ghost of die monarch should remain behind, radier like die Cheshire cat's smile, and that widiout diis remnant our system of government must fail. 41 le great republicans of die past, such as Tom Paine, would have found diis determination to maintain die shadow of monarchy as even more lu dicrous dian real monarchy (Paine, 1776 (Paine, /1986 .
File foundation of this position is that an appointed president will most closely resemble die appointed Governor-General. The latter is de facto appointed by die prime minister alone; die favoured 'minimalist' mediod is for appointment by bodi houses of die parliament by a special majority. It is interesting to note diat appoint ment of a president by the prime minister alone, although originally proposed by Mr Keating on die ABC's Lateliiie (15 September 1993), is not contemplated and is re garded as obviously unacceptable. Presumably, diis is because it is diought diat a president should not be merely die creature of die prime minister, and diat die role of president requires greater independence. This appears to be die sole concession ol die 'minimalists' to republicanism properly so called, a small concession to die idea ol balanced government. It is also notable diat appointment by a simple majority of bodi houses is not favoured because it is diought diat diis would not be different from ap pointment by die prime minister. This is an admission of die real major problem widi our system of government: excessive concentration of power in die hands of die prime minister, and prime ministerial control of die lower house.
The different mediod of appointment which is contemplated, however, would be likely to lead to a different result and to change die system of government, contrary to die stated intention. The favoured system of nomination by die prime minister and approval by a two-diirds majority of bodi houses means diat die prime minister, who now alone appoints die Governor-General, would have to gain die approval of at least die odier major political party in parliament for die prime ministerial nomination. This means diat die prime minister would have to pul forward a nominee acceptable to die odier major party, which implies diat consultations would take place before die nomination is made. Consultations among politicians lead to deals. The deal may be lor a candidate acceptable to bodi parties and not likely to offend any major strand of opinion in eidier party. A lowest-common-denominator effect could well set in. Re cent appointees as Governor-General might not have passed muster in such a party agreement. A political deal can also take die form of a trade-off. An opposition may well accept die government's nominee on die basis of some returned favour. The deal could be: 'W e do not really like your presidential nominee, but we will support die nomination if you will do somediing in return for us.' Political negotiations also notoriously tend to leak. The way in which die presidential nominee has been se lected would inevitably become known to die public. The deals would be explained in die press. T he selection process would dien be looked upon unfavourably by out siders, leading to a demand to replace diis unsavoury process widi direct election.
Regardless of whedier diis forecast would be likely to prove accurate in all re spects, die point is diat die different mediod of selection favoured by die 'minimalist' option would not leave die system of government as it is.
Contrary to die 'minimalist' position, a strong case can be made out diat a direedy elected president would constitute die least change from die current system of gov ernment. It is a question of constitutional design. The current system of constitu tional monarchy and responsible cabinet government centres on a head of state, die monarch, who is independent of die parliament Apart from occasions of revolution, die parliament does not choose die monarch; die crown as an institution is separately constituted. T he dieory of constitutional monarchy envisages diat die monarch will enjoy wide public support, shoring up die independence of die crown. GovemorsGeneral and governors, as representatives of die crown, were also originally supposed to be independent of parliament. The change to de facto appointment by die prime minister or premier may have undermined that independence, but the appointees may still be supported by the aura of die crown. But parliamentary appointment of a president, even by a special majority, would remove diat independence ol die head ol state. The prime minister's freedom of choice would be removed, but so would any remaining aura of die crown. The head of state would be, and would be seen to be, dependent on die parliament, or, in reality, on die two major parties. The proposal to have the president removable by die parliament widiout stated cause (Keadng, 1995) would gready reinforce diat dependence.
A direcdy elected president, however, would provide a republican replacement for die crown, widi independent public support and no dependence on parliamentary support for appointment or continuance in office.
W henever die possibility of elecdon is mentioned, die official republicans raise die quesdon of die powers of die office (Republic Advisory Committee, 1993:72-3) . It is pointed out diat die Governor-General possesses great powers under the Constitu tion, principally die power to appoint and dismiss ministries. It is claimed diat diese powers could not safely be entrusted to an elected president. This too is a curious argument from persons who call diemselves republicans. The powers are regarded as safe when vested in an appointee of die prime minister or a nominee of die prime minister approved by a deal widi die odier major political party, but diey may not be safely vested in a person independent of die ministry and die parliament and en dorsed by die electorate. Surely it is more rational to argue diat die extensive powers of die office require die independence and popular support of election. This conten tion is supported by die history of constitutional government. Extensive powers re quire election; appointed bodies can have only limited powers. Thus, die United States Senate, widi its great constitutional powers, was changed from an appointed to an elected body, while die hereditary and appointed House of Lords had its powers taken away.
Even if a president is to perform only die role of die Governor-General, holding great powers but exercising diem according to conventions, diis role would seem to require die independence and public support of direct election radier dian depend ence on die politicians. The Governor-General's role may be regarded as diat of an umpire, largely observing die political game and intervening only at times of difficulty to ensure compliance widi die rules. The role of a Governor-General becomes cru cial when responsible government ceases to work: when a lower house is incapable of supporting any ministry, when a prime minister refuses to resign or advise an election upon loss of die support of die lower house, and in similar situations. Many such cases have occurred, including recent cases in Australia. If vice-regal representatives have been successful in resolving diese situations, it is because it is understood diat diey perform die role of die crown. An effective republican umpire to resolve such situations requires independence and public support in substitution for the residual prestige ol the crown.
T he powers of the Governor-General are exercised in accordance with the prac tices, precedents and conventions associated with responsible government. In a re public, an independent president is likely to observe them more scrupulously dian one beholden to the politicians.
In short, considerations of institutional design, including the contention that we must follow the scheme of the existing system as far as possible, indicate that a presi dent dependent on the major parties is the most unsound option, and that direct elec tion achieves both of the aims of institutional balance and as little change as practicable to die existing system.
The Head of State and Popular Sovereignty
The official, 'minimalist', position, by rejecting so emphatically die option of an elected president, creates at die heart of die republican movement an enormous democratic deficit, which places it under a severe handicap, particularly in persuading die electors.
It is said diat we must have an indigenous head of state to be a symbol of die na tion, to represent Australia and its people, and to represent die people to themselves. It is not clear how such an exalted role can be performed by any officeholder unless die office has a strong and close link widi die people, or how such a link can be at tained except dirough popular election. It is highly unlikely diat such a role could be performed by a person appointed by die politicians. Govemors-General, widiout die handicap of being appointed by subterranean political deals, have not been able fully to perform such a task; one has die feeling diat in recent years diey have been less conspicuous to die people than in die past.
It is also said diat popular election would lead to a party contest and die election of a party politician, and diat a person selected by diis process would be incapable of properly performing die role of national symbol or that of constitutional umpire. It is somewhat contradictory so to imply diat an elected president would follow die parti san interests or instructions of die party which nominated and campaigned for him or her, while it is supposed diat a president appointed as a result of a deal between die major parties would not suffer from a similar, and more debilitating, dependence.
It is a non sequitur to claim diat a president elected alter a party contest would be incapable of performing die required role. T o a certain extent, die function of repre senting die nation as a whole is performed by die prime minister of die day, who is invited to make inspiring speeches and to launch great events, perhaps more often dian die Governor-General. A party politician elected to die presidency, and without die responsibility of actually exercising executive power, would be more capable in dial regard dian a prime minister. Such a president would be likely very quickly to become a former party politician transformed by die high office. This occurred, alter all, widi Mr Hayden and his politician-predecessors to a large degree.
In any case, it does not follow diat die electors would vote for party politicians. The unstated premise here is diat die electorate would be incapable of distinguishing between an election to choose a government to carry out favoured policies and an election to choose a head of state. It is more likely that die voters, if presented widi die choice of non-party candidates, would forsake die established political parties and return persons widiout partisan attachments. It would be important to ensure that the right to nominate candidates is not confined to political parties in or out ol parliament. The political parties would dien be likely to follow die signals ol die voters and nomi nate or support attractive 11011-party candidates. I11 order to facilitate diis effect, it may be desirable to restrict campaign spending by political parties in presidential elections.
It also does not follow, as has been repeatedly stated by exalted personages in re cent times, diat an elected presidency would preclude die choice of distinguished per sons. If candidates really are distinguished, diere is every likelihood that opinion leading groups would support diem and diat die people would vote for diem.
Other Republics
These contentions receive some support from die practices of die established repub lics of die world.
The number of stable republics widi constitutions diat have functioned for rea sonable periods widiout major unconstitutional episodes is relatively small, but so is die number of stable, democratic constitutional monarchies. Thirteen republics have been stable for die past 25 years or more under dieir current constitutions: Austria, Botswana, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Singapore, Switzerland and die United States of America. Four of diese countries have executive presidencies. The United States has a pure executive presidency; Botswana, Finland and France have hybrid systems in which die government is carried 011 by ministers in die legislature but die president also exercises executive power. Switzerland has a separately constituted, but not direcdy elected, collegiate executive, quite different from a parliamentary cabinet.
O f die remaining eight countries widi parliamentary cabinet systems of govern ment, four have direcdy elected presidents who perform a role similar to diat of Aus tralia's Governor-General. In Singapore and Ireland, party nominees have been elected as president, aldiough Singapore has had only one presidential election since changing to direct election, and at die last Irish election a 11011-party person was re turned, which may well inspire a change of practice in diat country. I11 Iceland and Austria, it has been die practice to elect distinguished persons who may or may not be supported by political parties. The current president of Iceland is regarded as so dis tinguished diat she has been re-elected on several occasions unopposed.
Iceland also provides a refutation of die claim diat die combination of an elected president and a cabinet system of government requires codification of die powers of die head of state: the Icelandic constitution contains as little specification of those powers as Aus tralia's.
The remaining four countries have cabinet systems of government with appointed presidents. All of diese countries drew up dieir constitutions in die aftermadi of World W ar II, and had historical reasons for avoiding elected heads of state. The constitution of die German Federal Republic was drafted amid die ruins of the war; since presidential elections were associated widi Hindenburg and die appointment of Hider, it is not surprising diat die precedent of die W eimar Republic was not fol lowed. India, which established its constitution immediately after a period of terrible communal violence, likewise eschewed presidential elections, which could have set one community against anodier. Israel in die same period was in a constant state of warfare, which made government by a single chamber possessing all powers appear to be die only option. Italy in die post-war period was haunted by die memory of Mus solini, and theref ore opted for collective (and weak) leadership. None of diese coun tries offers useful parallels for Australia.
Making allowance for die necessarily small number of examples, it can be said diat a cabinet system of government widi a head of state who performs essentially similar functions to Australia's Governor-General is compatible widi popular election of diat head of state. Such a combination does not necessarily involve the election of party politicians, but may also lead to die election of distinguished 11011-party persons.
The Problem of the States
The issue of die head of state arises at die State level, but widi an additional difficulty. One of die greatest problems widi State parliaments is diat diey are too small to sup port a proper system of cabinet government. Widi a house of fewer dian 100 mem bers, when a ministry is appointed from die majority and a shadow ministry from die minority, diere are few backbenchers left to undertake die parliamentary roles of monitoring executive activities and scrutinising legislation, particularly dirough a par liamentary committee system. It is politically very difficult to expand die State houses; indeed, diere are pressures to reduce dieir size as a way of lessening die burden 011 die taxpayer (see Tasmania, Board oflnquiry, 1994) .
It has been suggested diat die federal head of state could also act as die head of state of each of die States, just as die Governor-General is in effect head of state of die Australian Capital Territory, and diat States could share governors (Winterton, 1986:107) . Having to look after more dian one jurisdiction, however, would place too great a workload on die officeholders, if diey perform dieir duties diligendy, and would violate die federal principle of die independent constitution of die States.
The suggestion diat each of die States should have an elected governor, which is here submitted to be die appropriate constitutional arrangement if we are to retain parliamentary cabinet government, is likely to meet widi die very strong objection diat such an elected office would simply add to die burden 011 die taxpayer, especially if gubernatorial elections are to be held separately from parliamentary elections. But a solution exists diat would solve bodi die head of state issue at State level and die problem of die small size of State parliaments. This is a scheme dial could be under-taken as an experiment by one of the less populous States, such as South Australia or Tasmania. One advantage of federalism is that such experiments can be undertaken without affecting the whole country.
T he houses of the parliament of the State which experiments with this reform would continue with their current composition, or with their membership marginally reduced if it is desired to make the change cost-neutral. At the same time as the lower house is elected, a governor would be directly and separately elected by the electorate. The governor would be the head of state as well as the head ol government This of ficer would conduct the executive government and would appoint a small cabinet of ministers from outside the parliament The parliament would perform the legislative f unctions of passing laws and scrutinising die operations of government. The simulta neous election of die governor and die houses, or die lower house if die upper house has different tenns, would reduce die likelihood of serious deadlocks between die houses and die executive government. As each would be elected for a fixed term, diere would be no power of dissolution and no early elections. Upper houses would perform dieir present scrutiny and review functions. It is suggested that die houses should have die ability to scrutinise, but not to veto, executive appointments. An ex ecutive veto of legislation could be overridden by a special majority of die houses.
This would not be die American system. There would be no mid-term elections to increase die likelihood of disagreements between legislature and executive, and it would not involve adopting die American party or electoral systems. Even if die cur rent disciplined Australian party system remained in all its cohesion and discipline, diis scheme would still be an improvement, because die legislature would be freer to perform die legislative functions and die choice of ministers would not be limited to die parliamentary members of die majority party. The scheme would amount to die adoption at die State level of die basics of die system which has been used widi success in local government in some States for many years, whereby die mayor and council are separately but simultaneously elected. (On one view, an amendment of die Aus tralia Act 1986 may be necessary to allow a State to adopt diis system: see Waugh, 1996.) If one of die small States undertook diis experiment, we could assess whedier we should be so fearful of changing die system of government as die official republicans suggest. It is suggested diat, if adopted, diis scheme would prove so effective diat odier States would follow suit, and it may even be adopted at die federal level. The system of government would dien undoubtedly have been changed. There would be no doubt, however, diat it would be dioroughly republican. W e would also have fol lowed in die footsteps of die founders by not being af raid to try a system new and for eign to our traditions, as was federalism, in order to provide die country widi an effi cient as well as a truly republican constitution. 
